Tsleil-Waututh Nation left foreground on the north side Burrard Inlet in the trees opposite these petrochemical processes, Simon Fraser University top left, West Coast (Canada) Tidewater Terminal Alberta Tar-Sands, Petrochemical Processing including Chevron Oil Refinery centre right, also in the foreground on the north side Burrard Inlet is Hooker Chemical, in the trees opposite these petrochemical processes.
For 34 years I was an auditor of this regions First Nations and their related First entities ~ companies, co-ops, reserve lands and all related matters. For 34 years I looked for the documents recording these land sales to any government, indeed, to anyone, whatsoever. NOPE! We are all trespassers
under Simon Fraser University, Canada is building the West Coast Oceanside Terminal for export of Alberta Tar Sands right on an active seismic zone
See, Earthquake Risk Reduction
extract from
The 11th Canadian Conference on Earthquake Engineering
Canadian Association for Earthquake Engineering
https://www.caee.ca/pdf/Paper_94158.pdf
EARTHQUAKE
RISK MODELLING AND DISASTER RESILIENCE
PLANNING
AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL
Page
7 of 10
Fig. 4 – Indicator charts
summarizing risk reduction potential through structural
mitigation.
3.2.2. Building
Performance
Building performance
directly influences the safety and security of individuals, the
extent of social
disruption
following an
earthquake, and
the longer-term
economic security
of a
community. Key
performance
measures include the number of structures likely to sustain extensive
and/or complete
damage
(resistance), and the number of days needed to restore baseline
levels of functionality (recovery)
for
both baseline and mitigation scenarios.
For
current baseline conditions, It is estimated that ~840 buildings
would sustain extensive or complete
damage
in the Georgia Strait M7.3 scenario earthquake. The
majority of these are older concrete and
unreinforced
masonry structures in business precincts along the waterfront (~600
buildings), More than
215
residential structures and 25 public sector buildings are also likely
to be damaged beyond repair in
isolated
hotspots of severe shaking and ground failure throughout the
District.
Page
8 of 10
Specific measures that
might be considered to increase building performance include: the
strengthening
of foundation
connections; bracing and/or anchoring of frame, floor and roof
systems; the addition of
shear
walls; and a variety of other measures to help dissipate seismic
energy and resist the effects of
shear
and lateral drift. With mitigation
measures in place, all but 21 of the 839 buildings currently
exposed
to extensive or complete damage from a major earthquake would be
preserved from significant
damage
(Figure 3). Fifteen of the buildings still in danger of collapse are
situated along the industrial
waterfront
with the remaining six in surrounding commercial precincts. Nearly
all are larger unreinforced
masonry
buildings that are likely to collapse from severe ground shaking and
lateral spreading caused by
liquefaction.
Investments
in seismic retrofits to the most vulnerable buildings in the District
also have the effect of
reducing
recovery times for homes and businesses. The
greatest gains are in the residential sector,
where
mean recovery times are reduced by almost 95% (See Fig. 4).
Recovery times are reduced by ~4
months
for single-family homes and over one year for multi-family
residential buildings that have been
seismically
retrofitted. Recovery times are reduced ~4 months for commercial and
industrial buildings,
and ~1 week
for public sector buildings.
3.2.3.
Public Safety
Investments in
seismic retrofits have the potential to reduce the number of people
expected to sustain or
succumb to
life-threatening injuries for a daytime earthquake scenario by 52
(Fig. 4). The greatest gains
are
for older concrete and unreinforced masonry buildings, where safety
performance levels increase by
17%
and 28%, respectively. While this
represents a significant reduction in the number of
potential
fatalities, more than
1,300 people will still sustain injuries that require paramedic care
and ~425 will need
emergency
medical care at a hospital — even with mitigation measures in
place.
Although most of the
population is likely to shelter in place, it is expected that more
than 3,000 residents
would likely
be displaced from their homes for up to 20 days after the scenario
earthquake to allow time
for
building inspections and restoration of lifeline services.
While the majority of those displaced will
seek
temporary accommodation with
friends and family, several hundred people would require
emergency
shelter and social
services from local authorities and supporting aid agencies. Seismic
retrofit measures
are most
effective in reducing the extent of social disruption for those
displaced three months or more
(See
Fig. 4). More than 13,000 people who would otherwise be displaced by
the earthquake are expected
to
return to their homes and places of work with mitigation measures in
place. The most significant
reductions
in social disruption are for residents displaced more than a year
(~1,500 people), and for
employees
displaced for 3 months or more (~16,500 workers).
3.2.4.
Lifeline Resilience
Lifeline
resilience measures the extent to which critical infrastructure
systems can absorb the impacts of
sudden
shocks that threaten structural coherence and functional integrity,
and the capability of these
systems
to provide
access to
essential services
during the
recovery process.
Target criteria
are
expressed
in terms of performance measures that track the number of system
components that are
expected to
remain functional following a major earthquake (resistance), and the
number of days required
to restore
water and power services to the community (recovery).
Water
utilities and related lifeline services are particularly vulnerable
to earthquake damage and loss of
functionality
in areas
of severe
ground shaking,
and in
older neighbourhoods
where pipelines
are
constructed
of older brittle materials that are less resistant to settling and
lateral displacements caused by
earthquake-triggered
liquefaction. Earthquake damages are expected to result in leaks and
breaks that
would require
at least
100 repairs
to restore
potable water
service, and
~250 repairs
to restore
functionality
for wastewater infrastructure. For
current conditions, it is estimated that more than half of all
homes
and businesses would be without water for up to 7 days after the
earthquake. Depending on the
size
and capacity of repair crews, it would take up to 18 days to restore
full service capacity. Nearly
700
homes and businesses that would
otherwise be without services would have access to potable
water
within 7 days as a result of
investments in seismic retrofits to pipelines and water facilities.
In addition,
the
time required to restore full service capacity is likely to be
reduced by one week or more. This
represents
a ~ 40% increase in service capacity for potable water systems and a
~70% increase for
wastewater
systems.
Page
9 of 10
Our
assessment of power system resilience is limited to an analysis of
damages to electrical substations
within
the District and does not account for upstream dependencies on power
generation or distribution.
Electrical
facilities are expected to sustain a ~50% drop in service capacity
with as many as 18,000
homes and
businesses without access to power immediately after the earthquake
and ~3,500 without
power one week
later. Investments in seismic
retrofits to vulnerable facilities have the potential to
increase
overall system
resistance with
~7,000 fewer
service interruptions
immediately after
the
earthquake,
and a significantly shorter amount of time to restore full service
capacity to the community.
Gains in
system resilience have important implications on business
interruption and overall economic
security
during the recovery process.
See Geological Survey of Canada
Open File 7677 A Profile of Earthquake Risk for the District of North Vancouver, British Columbia
SCAN Search Results: Fastlink
Natural Resources Canada, Corporate Management and Services Sector, Chief Information Officer Branch
Dec 7, 2015 ... Survey of Canada, Open File 7677, 2015 p. 1-14, https://doi.org/10.4095/296264 Open Access. Download (whole publication) More Display on a map Community profile; Journeay, J M; Dercole, F; Mason, D; in, A profile of earthquake risk for the District of North Vancouver, British Columbia; Journeay, J M; Dercole, F; Mason, D; Westin, M; Prieto, J A; Wagner, C L
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